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 A B S T R A C T  
Transfer pricing is a way conducted by a multinational company to do tax avoid-
ance. Concentrated ownership structure makes the majority shareholders tend to 
perform a tunneling incentive that could harm minority shareholders. Companies 
that set bonus mechanism based on the profits will make the management or the 
board of directors tend to conduct profit manipulation. The aim of this research is to 
analyze the influence of tax, tunneling incentive and bonus mechanism on transfer 
pricing decision taken by manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The sample used on this study is manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2014 totaling 69 companies taken using purpo-
sive sampling method. The analysis technique used in this study is analysis binary 
logistic regression. The result of this study shows that tax and tunneling incentive 
have significantly influence on transfer pricing, while bonus mechanism does not 
have significant influence on transfer pricing. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Transfer pricing adalah cara yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan multinasional untuk 
melakukan penghindaran pajak. Struktur kepemilikan yang dikonsentrasikan mem-
buat pemegang saham mayoritas cenderung melakukan insentif tunneling yang 
dapat merugikan pemegang saham minoritas. Perusahaan yang mengatur meka-
nisme bonus berdasarkan keuntungan akan membuat manajemen atau dewan direk-
si untuk melakukan manipulasi keuntungan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah 
untuk menganalisis pengaruh insentif pajak, tunneling dan mekanisme bonus ter-
hadap keputusan penetapan transfer pricingr yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan ma-
nufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Sampel yang digunakan dalam 
penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
pada tahun 2012-2014 sebanyak 69 perusahaan yang diambil menggunakan metode 
purposive sampling. Teknik analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah 
analisis regresi logistik biner. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa insentif 
pajak dan tunneling berpengaruh signifikan terhadap transfer pricing, sedangkan 
mekanisme bonus tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap transfer pricing. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid economic development, without recognizing 
the country's boundaries, has made the flow of 
trade transactions between countries, which make 
it easier and smoother. A number of companies 
have begun to expand their market by establishing 
a subsidiary in the country and abroad, which indi-
rectly leading to the formation of multinational 
corporations. The formation of various organiza-
tions and agreements, such as the ASEAN Econom-
ic Community, facilitates the trade transactions. 
Multinational corporations do a lot of transactions 
with their relation companies in various countries 
with the aim of gaining maximum profit margin. 
In conducting trade transactions, multinational 
corporations always face problems related to the 
difference in tax rates in each country. Such condi-
tion has eventually prompted the multinational 
corporations to decide transfer pricing. Transfer 
pricing leads to the problem of manipulation to the 
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amount of tax payable on a related taxpayer (Harta-
ti et al. 2014). In general, transfer pricing is defined 
as a company policy in setting transfer prices re-
lated to certain transactions in the form of goods, 
services, tangible assets, and so on. 
Transfer pricing has become an interesting 
global issue in taxation authorities and is still diffi-
cult for the government to resolve it due to differ-
ences in interests between businesspersons and tax 
offices in various countries. From the government 
perspective, the practice of transfer pricing is be-
lieved to have the potential to reduce a country's 
tax revenue, while from the business perspective, 
the practice of transfer pricing is favorable to the 
company so that the company will seek to minim-
ize the burden of paying corporate taxes. 
Transfer pricing practiced by multinational 
corporations has occurred several times in Indone-
sia, one of them is by PT Toyota Motor Manufactur-
ing Indonesia. The Directorate General of Taxation 
suspected that the company performed tax evasion 
as much as IDR 1.2 trillion through transfer pricing. 
PT Toyota was found to have exported goods 
abroad with the selling price below market value. 
There are several reasons why companies de-
cide to perform transfer pricing. The first reason is 
tax motivation. Based on political cost theory, the 
government requires multinational companies to 
pay taxes, which in turn making the companies get 
pressure because they must routinely pay taxes to 
the state. Due to the pressure, corporate managers 
will tend to choose to perform transfer pricing to 
their group companies in other countries so that the 
tax paid by the company can be as minimum as 
possible. 
The second reason that allows companies to 
perform transfer pricing is tunneling incentive. 
Based on agency theory, the foreign controlling 
shareholders seek to obtain maximum capital re-
turn from their ownership by way of governing 
management to conduct transactions with related 
parties in the form of transfer pricing that can harm 
non-controlling shareholders. Foreign controlling 
shareholders freely perform tunneling by selling 
the company's product below market price or not 
paying dividends to non controlling shareholders. 
The third reason that allows companies to per-
form transfer pricing is bonus mechanism. Based 
on the agency theory, the company owners want 
better performance from their directors in order to 
increase the company’s profit. Meanwhile the direc-
tors also want the same thing, that is, the profit in 
the form of bonus for their performance. The 
amount of profit can make the directors justify any 
means to obtain maximum bonus by manipulating 
the financial statements through transfer pricing 
between parties concerned. 
Previous research conducted by Mispiyanti 
(2015) shows that the variables of tax and bonus 
mechanisms do not have significant influence on 
transfer pricing. Meanwhile the research conducted 
by Hartati et al. (2014) shows that the variables of 
tax and bonus mechanism have significant influ-
ence on transfer pricing. 
Based on the description above and the exist-
ing research gaps, it is necessary to conduct this 
research with the aim to re-examine the influence of 
tax, tunneling incentive, and bonus mechanism on 
transfer pricing decision in manufacturing compa-
nies. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1967) state that agency theory 
is a theory that explains the relationship between 
manager, as agent, and shareholder, as principal. 
The relationship is realized when there is an 
agreement or contract between one or more prin-
cipals, where the principal gives orders to the agent 
to perform services on behalf of the principal by 
authorizing the agent to manage and make the best 
decision for the interest of the principal (Brundy 
2014: 4). 
Companies managed by other than the owners 
will lead to different wishes, utilities, and interests 
between the principal and the agent. The agent 
tends to prosper his own interests and exclude the 
interests of the principal. In such a condition, it can 
be seen that both the agent and the principal strive 
to achieve and maintain the welfare level according 
to their will. 
 
Political Cost Theory 
Political cost theory is a theory which is related to 
policy. This theory explains that the greater the 
political cost borne by the company, the greater the 
possibility of the manager to choose the accounting 
methods or procedures that can suspend profit 
reporting from the current period to the period to 
come. 
The relationship between political cost theory 
and transfer pricing is that large companies may be 
subject to higher performance standards, especially 
when the companies also have a high profitability 
capability, thus increasing political costs. In addi-
tion, the social pressure from the government that 
requires companies to pay taxes to the state also 
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makes the companies perform transfer pricing to 
minimize the tax paid. The way that can be done by 
the companies is to transfer their tax liabilities to 
their relation companies located in other countries, 
whose tax rates are lower, by reducing the selling 
price. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing is a company policy to determine 
the transfer price or transaction of goods, services, 
intangible assets and financial transactions con-
ducted by the company. Transfer pricing is also 
defined as the value attached to the transfer of 
goods or services where there is a transaction 
among parties that have a special relationship. Ac-
cording to Setiawan (2014), transfer pricing can be 
grouped into two: (1) intra-company, where trans-
fer pricing occurs between divisions within a com-
pany; (2) inter-company, where transfer pricing 
occurs between different companies within the 
country and abroad having a special relationship. 
According to Suandy (2011: 76-77), the policy 
of establishing transfer pricing is chosen by a com-
pany to achieve certain objectives of maximizing 
the profit earned by the company globally, securing 
the competitive position of branch companies 
abroad, controlling the credibility of the associa-
tion, setting up adequate cash flow of branch com-
panies, fostering good relations with local adminis-
trations, reducing the burden of tax imposition and 
import duties, as well as reducing the risk of a gov-
ernment takeover. 
 
Tax 
Tax can be interpreted as a contribution of the 
people to the state treasury that can be enforced 
under the law by receiving no direct reward. Under 
the Taxation Law (Act No. 36 of 2008), tax is de-
fined as the compulsory contribution of the public, 
both individual and corporate, to the state by re-
ceiving no direct rewards but fully utilized for the 
purposes of the state and the welfare of the people. 
From the economic perspective, tax can be un-
derstood as transferring resources from the private 
sector to the public sector. From the legal perspec-
tive, tax is an engagement that arises on the basis of 
law that obliges the citizen to deposit a portion of 
his income to the state in which the state has the 
authority to force and later the tax money will be 
used for the administration. 
Each country has a different tax rate. The dif-
ference has encouraged multinational companies 
that conduct international trade try to find a way to 
avoid overpaid taxes. Multinational companies will 
be encouraged to perform transfer pricing by shift-
ing their tax liability to their existing relation com-
panies in the countries that charge lower tax rates. 
The greater the value of the effective corporate tax 
rate, the greater the tax burden borne by the com-
pany so that it will encourage the company to per-
form transfer pricing. 
 
Effective Tax Rate 
The tax rate is the amount of the value used to de-
termine the tax payable to be paid by the taxpayer 
to the government in accordance with applicable 
law. Effective tax rate is basically a percentage of 
the tax rate borne by the company. Effective tax 
rate (ETR) is calculated based on financial informa-
tion produced by the company. So, effective tax 
rate is the calculation of corporate tax rate. 
 
Tunneling Incentive 
According to Hartati et al. (2014), tunneling incen-
tive is the behavior of the majority shareholders 
who transfer both the assets and the profits of the 
company for their personal gain by fixing the fees 
charged to the minority shareholders. Tunneling 
incentive occurs in two forms, that is, the control-
ling shareholder can move the entire company's 
resources on him through related transactions and 
the majority shareholder can increase the propor-
tion of the company without transferring assets 
through the issuance of shares or other transac-
tions. 
According to Mutamimah (2009), there are two 
types of ownership structures that reflect an agency 
conflict, 1) the dispersed ownership structure, that 
is, between the manager and the shareholders; 2) 
the concentrated ownership structure, in which the 
ownership is concentrated on the right of control 
and the right of cash flows on certain parties, 
whether family, government, or others, as a con-
trolling shareholder. 
In concentrated ownership structure, the own-
ership is concentrated on the control rights of cer-
tain parties as the foreign controlling shareholder, 
which tends to create a conflict of interest between 
the foreign controlling shareholder and the man-
agement with the non controlling shareholder. This 
will lead the controlling shareholder to abuse the 
right of control for his own welfare by tunneling 
through related party transactions. The greater the 
ownership of shares owned by foreign controlling 
shareholders, the greater the influence of foreign 
controlling shareholders in determining the various 
decisions in the company including the policy of 
determining in transfer pricing. 
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Bonus Mechanism 
Bonus mechanism is a component of the calcula-
tion of the amount of bonus given by the owner of 
the company or shareholders through the General 
Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) to members of the 
board of directors who are considered to have a 
good performance every year and when the com-
pany makes a profit. The bonus mechanism, 
which is based on the amount of profit, will make 
the directors attempt to manipulate the profit and 
even perform actions that regulate the net profit in 
order to be able to maximize the bonus they re-
ceive. 
The bonus mechanism which is based on the 
amount of profit is the most popular way for the 
company owner to reward his directors. The owner 
of the company assesses the performance of the 
board by looking at the company's overall earnings 
so that the board will try to increase the company's 
profit with the aim at maximizing the bonus they 
will receive by permitting any means such as trans-
fer pricing. As a result of this transaction, there will 
be one sub-unit of the company that is harmed. 
Thus, the greater the profits set by the owner of the 
company, the more likely the directors are trying to 
maximize their bonuses by transfer pricing. 
The research framework can be expressed as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Based on the background, problem formula-
tion, research objectives, previous research and 
theoretical basis, the hypothesis can be formulated 
as follows: 
H1: Tax has a significant effect on transfer pricing 
decision. 
H2: Tunneling incentive has a significant effect on 
transfer pricing decision. 
H3: Bonus mechanism has a significant on transfer 
pricing decision. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Design 
This research is a quantitative research, which ana-
lyzes the numerical data that is tested by statistical 
method, and the result will be interpreted to obtain 
a conclusion. Based on the method, this research is 
classified in historical research, that is, the research 
which is related to past events in the form of sys-
tematic and objective corporate past financial re-
port. Based on the data source, this research is a 
study using secondary data sources, in which the 
data is obtained from the various existing sources, 
such as financial reports, journals, books, and oth-
ers. 
 
Variable Identification 
The dependent variable (Y) is transfer pricing deci-
sion, while the independent variables (X) are tax 
(X1), tunneling incentive (X2), and bonus mechan-
ism (X3). 
 
Operational Definition of Variables and Mea-
surements 
Transfer Pricing 
The transfer pricing in this study is the sale of 
products from one division to another division hav-
ing a special relationship and locating in another 
country which has lower tax rate than Indonesia 
(Mispiyanti 2015). 
Transfer pricing is calculated using dichotom-
ous approach by looking at the presence or absence 
 
 
 
H1 
 
H2 
 
H3 
 
 
Figure 1 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Table 1 
Results of Descriptive Analysis of Tax and Bonus Mechanism 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Tax 69 .09 1.35 .2734 .16197 
Bonus Mechanism 69 -50.11 386.61 8.8807 48.47576 
Valid N (listwise) 69     
Source: Processed data. 
Tunneling 
Incentive 
Bonus 
Mechanism 
Transfer 
Pricing 
Tax 
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of sales to a related party. Dummy variable is used 
in this study. Foreign-owned Companies that sell to 
related parties located in other countries with lower 
tax rates than Indonesia are given a value of 1, 
while others are assigned a value of 0 (Mispiyanti 
2015). 
 
Tax 
Tax is a compulsory contribution to a state based 
on the law. It can be imposed and without any re-
ciprocity, whereby the contribution will be used to 
finance the state expenditures. 
According to Hartati et al. (2014), tax is meas-
ured using the effective tax rate (ETR) and can be 
formulated as follows: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =
𝑇𝑎𝑥  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 −𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑇𝑎𝑥  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑇𝑎𝑥
. (1) 
 
Tunneling Incentive 
Tunneling incentive is the behavior of the control-
ling shareholders who transfer the company's as-
sets and profits for their own benefit but the 
charges are charged to non controlling shareholders 
(Hartati et al. 2014). 
Tunneling incentive is proxied by dividend 
distribution to the company's shareholders by us-
ing dummy variable, in which the company doing 
the dividend distribution is given a value of 1, 
while the non-dividend distribution is given value 
of 0. 
 
Bonus Mechanism 
The bonus mechanism is the component of the cal-
culation of the amount of bonus given by the com-
pany owner or shareholder through the GMS to the 
member of the board of directors each year when 
earning profit. 
The bonus mechanism is measured using the 
net profit trend index formula, which is calculated 
based on the percentage of net income achievement 
in year t of net income t-1 (Hartati et al. 2014). 
Net Profit Trend Index =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑡−1
. (2) 
 
Population, Sample and Sampling Technique 
The population in this study is manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in 2012-2014. The sampling technique of the popu-
lation is conducted using purposive sampling with 
the following criteria: (1) Manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange; (2) Manu-
facturing companies issuing financial report data in 
2012-2014; (3) Manufacturing companies controlled 
by foreign companies with ownership percentage 
of 20% or more as the controlling shareholder; (4) 
Manufacturing companies that do not experience 
losses during the observation period; (5) The com-
pany's financial statements are not presented in 
foreign currency. 
 
Data and Data Collection Methods 
The nature of this research is quantitative. The type 
of data source used is secondary data in the form of 
financial statements of manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2012-2014. 
Data collection method used in this research is do-
cumentary by collecting, recording, and reviewing 
data of manufacturing companies’ financial state-
ments published on IDX and from various other 
sources related to transfer pricing. 
 
Analysis Technique 
Logistic regression analysis is used to know the 
influence of independent variables (tax, tunneling 
incentive, and bonus mechanism) on dependent 
variable (transfer pricing) with the formula is as 
 
Table 2 
Results of Descriptive Analysis of Transfer Pricing 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 28 40.6 40.6 40.6 
1.00 41 59.4 59.4 100.0 
Total 69 100.0 100.0  
Source: Processed data. 
 
Table 3 
Results of Descriptive Analysis of Tunneling Incentive 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 15 21.7 21.7 21.7 
1.00 54 78.3 78.3 100.0 
Total 69 100.0 100.0  
Source: Processed data. 
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follows: 
Y = 𝐿𝑛
𝑃
1−𝑝
=b0 + B1X1 + B2X2 +B3X3 + e. (3) 
Explanation: 
Ln  = Transfer pricing 
P = Probability of a company to perform transfer 
pricing 
b0 = Constants 
B = Coefficients 
X1 = Tax 
X2 = Tunneling incentive 
X3 = Bonus mechanism 
e  = Error. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Analysis 
The data used in this research is transfer pricing, 
tax, tunneling incentive, and bonus mechanism. 
The purpose of descriptive analysis is to explain the 
maximum, minimum, mean, and standard devia-
tion on the dependent variable and independent 
variables in this study. Descriptive statistics can be 
seen in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. 
Table 1 describes the minimum, maximum, 
mean, and standard deviation values of the va-
riables of tax and bonus mechanism for all manu-
facturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2012-2014. In the variable of tax, there 
is a range from 0.09 to 1.35 between the minimum 
and maximum of the effective tax rate existing in 
manufacturing companies on the Stock Exchange. 
Table 2 describes the number of companies in-
dicated to perform transfer pricing and not to per-
form transfer pricing. Seen from the total sample, 
there are 41 sample companies indicated to perform 
transfer pricing. 
Table 3 describes the number of companies 
conducting tunneling incentive in terms of divi-
dend payout. The variable of tunneling incentive in 
this study is indicated by dummy variable in which 
all samples are 69 observation objects. 15 observa-
tion objects do not perform dividend payout and 54 
others perform dividend payout. 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
-2 Log Likelihood 
The model testing is done by comparing the value 
of the initial -2LogL on Block 0 before the inclusion 
Table 4 
L Likelihood without Independent Variables 
Iteration Historya,b,c 
Iteration -2 Log likelihood 
Coefficients 
Constant 
 
Step 0 
1 93.191 .377 
2 93.190 .381 
3 93.190 .381 
Source: Processed data. 
 
Table 5 
Likelihood L with Independent Variables 
Iteration Historya,b,c,d 
Iteration -2 Log likelihood 
Coefficients 
Constant P TI MB 
Step 1 
1 83.715 -1.352 3.288 1.032 .003 
2 79.874 -2.706 7.941 1.285 .004 
3 78.636 -3.795 12.302 1.318 .004 
4 78.528 -4.227 14.060 1.326 .004 
5  78.528 -4.260 14.187 1.329 .004 
6  78.528 -4.260 14.188 1.329 .004 
Source: Processed data. 
 
Table 6 
Nagerkerke’s R Square Test 
Determination Coefficients 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 78.528a .191 .258 
Source: Processed data. 
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of independent variables with values from -2LogL 
on Block 1 after the inclusion of independent va-
riables. 
The test results, as seen in Table 4, show that 
the value of -2LogL on Block 0 is 93.191, while in 
Table 5 the value of -2LogL on Block 1 is 83.715. In 
the table, it can be seen that there is a decline in the 
value of -2LogL after the inclusion of independent 
variables in the logistic regression model so that the 
model hypothesized fit with the data. 
The value of Nagelkerke R Square is an indica-
tion of the magnitude of the determination coeffi-
cients. The result of determination coefficients test 
presented in Table 6 shows that the value of Nagel-
kerke R Square is 0.258, indicating that the variabil-
ity of dependent variable which can be explained 
by the variability of independent variable is 25.8%, 
while 74.2% is influenced by other variables not 
examined in research. 
 
Hosmer Test and Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit 
Test 
Hosmer test and Lemeshow's Goodness of Fit Test 
are used to see whether there is a significant differ-
ence between the model and the observation value 
as a determinant of whether the model can predict 
the observed value well or not. 
The result of calculation of Hosmer and Leme-
show Chi-square presented in Table 7 shows the 
value of 2.205 with a significance probability of 
0.974, in which the value is more than 0.05. So it can 
be concluded that the model used is able to predict 
the observation value. 
 
Classification Test 
The classification accuracy test aims to calculate the 
correct and incorrect estimation value. Based on the 
test results, the strength to predict the possibility of 
the company doing transfer pricing practice is 
92.7%. This indicates that there are 38 companies 
that are predicted to perform transfer pricing from 
a total of 41 companies that perform transfer pric-
ing. The strength to predict the companies that do 
not perform transfer pricing is 42.9%, which means 
that there are 12 companies that are predicted not 
to perform transfer pricing from a total of 36 com-
panies that do not perform transfer pricing (see 
Table 8). 
 
Hypothesis Analysis 
Hypothesis testing is done by comparing the level 
of significance of each independent variable, with a 
significance level of 0.10 or 10%. If the significance 
value < 0.10, it can be said that the independent 
variable has a significant influence on the depen-
dent variable and vice versa. Table 9 is the result of 
Table 7 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 2.205 8 .974 
Source: Processed data. 
 
Table 8 
Classification Table 
Observed 
Predicted 
Transfer Pricing 
% Correct 
.00 1.00 
Transfer Pricing 
.00 12 16 42.9 
1.00 3 38 92.7 
Overall Percentage   72.5 
Source: Processed data. 
 
Table 9 
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Df. Sig. 
 
 
Step 1a 
P 14.188 5.909 5.765 1 .016 
TI 1.329 .739 3.233 1 .072 
MB .004 .009 .164 1 .686 
Constant -4.260 1.675 6.471 1 .011 
Source: Processed data. 
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the logistic regression coefficients test, which shows 
the level of influence of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable. 
Based on the results in Table 9, it can be con-
cluded that the test results of the logistic regression 
coefficients of each independent variables are as 
follows: 
TP = -4.260 + 14.188P + 1.329TI + 0.004MB 
Tax variable has a significance level of 0.016 as 
seen in Table 9. The test results indicate that the 
significance level of tax variable is 0.016 < 0.05 < 
0.10, which means that H1 is accepted. So, it can be 
concluded that tax has a significant influence on the 
transfer pricing decision. 
Variable of tunneling incentive has a signific-
ance level of 0.072, as seen in Table 9. The test re-
sults indicate that the significance level of tunneling 
incentive variable is 0.072 < 0.10, which means that 
H2 is accepted. So, it can be concluded that tunne-
ling incentive has a significant influence on the 
transfer pricing decision. 
Variable of bonus mechanism has a signific-
ance level of 0.686, as seen in Table 9. The test re-
sults indicate that the significance level of bonus 
mechanism variable is 0.686 > 0.10, which means 
that H3 is rejected. So, it can be concluded that bo-
nus mechanism has no significant influence on the 
transfer pricing decision. 
 
Discussion 
The Influence of Tax on Transfer Pricing Decision 
Based on the results of hypothesis testing that has 
been done, it can be seen that the variable of effec-
tive tax rate has a significant effect on the transfer 
pricing decisions at manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, indicating 
that the hypothesis is accepted. Tax rates become 
one of the reasons for many multinational compa-
nies to perform transfer pricing practices where the 
amount of tax payable is a burden to the company 
so that the company will seek to minimize the 
amount of the payments. 
Based on the theory of political cost, the de-
termination of a country's tax rates is closely related 
to government policy, where there are government 
policies that require multinational companies to 
pay taxes. It, in turns, makes the companies get 
social pressure from the government, where the 
company must regularly pay taxes to the state, es-
pecially when the companies have the ability to 
achieve high profits, then the tax that must be 
borne by the companies is also higher. Therefore, 
the company manager will tend to choose to per-
form transfer pricing to its group of companies in 
other countries so that the tax paid by the compa-
nies can be minimized by shifting their tax liabili-
ties from a country that has high tax rates to their 
relative or affiliates in other countries that have 
lower tax rates. This is usually done by minimizing 
the selling price. This is done to manipulate the 
company's profits so that the profits earned by the 
company in a given year will look lower or even in 
loss. And this indirectly will have an effect on the 
smaller amount of taxes paid by the companies to 
the state. 
The results are also in accordance with the re-
sults of the research conducted by Hartati et al. 
(2014) which also proves that tax has a significant 
influence on the company's decision to perform 
transfer pricing, where the decision will make tax 
payments lower globally. This happens because the 
company wants to get the maximum profit from its 
business activities. Therefore, it can be said that the 
greater the value of the company’s effective tax 
rate, the greater the tax burden borne by the com-
pany, thus encouraging the company to perform 
transfer pricing. 
 
The Influence of Tunneling Incentive on Transfer 
Pricing Decision 
Based on the results of hypothesis testing that has 
been done, it can be seen that the variable of tunne-
ling incentive has a significant effect on transfer 
pricing decisions at manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, indicating 
that the hypothesis is accepted. Based on agency 
theory, there is relationship between agent and 
principal. In this study, the shareholder of the 
company is a foreign controlling shareholder in 
which the foreign controlling shareholder seeks to 
obtain maximum capital return from his level of 
ownership by way of governing the management to 
conduct transactions with related parties that 
would harm the non-controlling shareholders. One 
of the transactions with related parties that can be 
done is transfer pricing. 
The results are also in accordance with the re-
sults of the research conducted by Mispiyanti 
(2015) which explain that the company shares 
owned by foreign controlling shareholders will 
tend to sell to related parties with improper pricing 
for the interests of the foreign controlling share-
holders located in the country whose tax rate is 
lower than the tax rate in Indonesia. 
Multinational companies in Indonesia tend to 
have a concentrated ownership structure so that it 
will create a conflict of interest between the for-
eign controlling shareholder and the non-
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controlling shareholder. In this case, the foreign 
controlling shareholder has a special right to over-
see the management within the company so that it 
would be possible for the foreign controlling 
shareholder to commit authority abuse such as 
conducting a related party transaction by selling 
the company's product below the market price to 
the company that is still under his control result-
ing in the profit earned by the company becomes 
lower. However, when the company gains more 
profit, the foreign controlling shareholder tends to 
perform tunneling through transfer pricing by 
transferring all the profits of the company to his 
personal wellbeing rather than having to distri-
bute it as a dividend to the non controlling share-
holder. In other words, the greater the ownership 
of shares owned by foreign controlling sharehold-
ers, the greater the influence of foreign controlling 
shareholders in determining the various decisions 
in the company including the policy of determin-
ing transfer pricing. 
 
The influence of Bonus Mechanism on Transfer 
Pricing 
Based on the results of hypothesis testing that has 
been done, it can be seen that the bonus mechanism 
variable has no significant effect on transfer pricing 
decisions at manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, indicating that the hy-
pothesis is rejected. These results are not in line 
with the results of the research conducted by Har-
tati et al. (2014) that the bonus mechanism variable 
has significant effect on the transfer pricing deci-
sions. 
Based on agency theory, the company owner 
and the director have their own respective inter-
ests in the company. The company owner wants 
better performance from the director in order to 
increase the profit of the company. Meanwhile, 
the director also wants the same thing, that is, 
profit in the form of bonuses for the performance 
that has been provided to the company. Although 
the amount of profits leads to director trying to 
maximize the receipt of bonuses, it does not mean 
that the director will justify any means by commit-
ting fraud such as manipulating financial state-
ments by utilizing transfer pricing transactions 
between related parties to increase sales, where 
the sales are indirectly can increase corporate 
profits and bonuses they will receive. Based on the 
study conducted by Mispiyanti (2015), the exis-
tence of a proper bonus policy can minimize the 
chance for the director to perform transfer pricing 
to obtain the expected main objective , that is, bo-
nus. Thus, the amount of profit does not make the 
director decide to perform transfer pricing, be-
cause the director or management of the company 
has set strategies in achieving the target of bonus 
to be obtained from the company owner by inno-
vating the strategy so that the possibility to per-
form transfer pricing will be smaller. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This research was conducted with the aim to ana-
lyze the effect of tax, tunneling incentive, and bo-
nus mechanism on transfer pricing decision at 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. The sample data were obtained 
from 69 manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2014. Sources of 
research data were obtained from the official web-
site of the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Based on the results of the research that has 
been done, it can be concluded that the variable of 
tax (X1) has a significant influence on the compa-
ny's decision to perform transfer pricing. The 
greater the effective tax rates of a company, the 
greater the tax burden borne by the company, thus 
encouraging the company to perform transfer 
pricing. This is done by transferring the tax liabili-
ty of the company to its relation company residing 
in another country having lower tax rate than in 
Indonesia. 
The variable of tunneling incentive (X2) has a 
significant influence on the company’s decision to 
perform transfer pricing. The greater the ownership 
of shares owned by foreign controlling sharehold-
ers, the greater the influence of the foreign control-
ling shareholders in determining the various deci-
sions in the company including the policy of de-
termining the transfer pricing. This is because com-
panies whose ownership is concentrated on foreign 
controlling shareholders will tend to perform 
tunneling either by selling to companies that are 
still under their control or by not paying dividends 
to non-controlling shareholders. 
The variable of bonus mechanism (X3) has no 
significant influence on the company's decision to 
perform transfer pricing. The amount of profit does 
not make the directors decide to perform transfer 
pricing, because the company directors or man-
agement have set strategies in achieving the target 
bonus to be obtained from the company owner by 
innovating strategy so that the possibility to per-
form transfer pricing will be smaller. 
This research has some limitations, such as: 
first, the measurement of transfer pricing variables 
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is limited to dichotomous measurements using 
dummy variable; second, the information pre-
sented in the annual financial statements is not in 
detail, enabling the researchers to use subjectivity 
in determining the required information; third, the 
lack of theory and sources of transfer pricing, 
tunneling incentive, and bonus mechanisms made 
the researchers difficult to obtain a complete 
theory to support this research; fourth, the value 
of determination coefficient in this research is still 
relatively small (0.259), indicating that the va-
riables of tax, tunneling incentive, and bonus me-
chanism are only able to influence the company's 
decision to transfer pricing of 25.9%, which means 
that there are other variables that are not included 
in this research (74.1%) that can affect the va-
riables studied. 
Based on the conclusions and limitations in 
this study, this study suggests that further re-
searchers should 1) use research sample other than 
manufacturing companies to expand the research, 
such as mining companies, 2) use other indicators 
to measure the effect of tax, tunneling incentive, 
and bonus mechanism on transfer pricing decision, 
3) use variables other than the variables used in this 
research that might have an effect on the transfer 
pricing decision, 4) extend the study period to be 
able to provide better research results. 
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